State of Utah v. Marvin Brown : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
State of Utah v. Marvin Brown : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; attorney general; counsel for appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; counsel for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Brown, No. 20080771 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1164
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
MARVIN BROWN, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20080771-CA 
BRJEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM THE JUDGMENT. SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT 
OF THE HONORABLE FRED D HOWARD. AFTER CONVICTION FOR 
RETAIL THEFT. A THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
775 We si Center Street 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone- (801) 318-3194
 R(_ED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
Counsel for Appellant 
MAY 1 2 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Ened in Admitting Evidence of Brown's Prior 
Convictions under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence 7 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 12 
ADDENDA 13 
Rules 403-404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory Provisions 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 1-2, 7-9, 11 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 1-3, 7-8 
Cases Cited 
Salt Lake City v. Stnihs, 2004 UT App 489, 106 P.3d 188 8 
State v. Brace, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) 11 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1990) 9-10 
State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837 1,8-9 
State v. Fedorwicz, 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194 1 
State v. Florez, 111 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989) 8, 11 
State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984) 8 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120 9 
State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, 8 P.3d 1025 8 
State v. Rees, 2004 UT App 51, 88 P.3d 359 8 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) 9 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993) 12 
State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989) 12 
United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1988) 8 
United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1987) 8 
United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1987) 9 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARVIN BROWN, 
i~\~r i j.i A 11 - _ x 
i^ciciiumn//\ppeiiaiu 
Case No. 20080771-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in allowing Marvin Brown's prior convictions to be 
admitted as evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
trial court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, % 24, 52 P.3d 1194; see also 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^ 18, 993 P.2d 837. This issue was preserved in a timely 
objection made by defense counsel (R. 182: 9-15, 17-18). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Defendant, Marvin Brown, appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
commitment of the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court, after he was 
convicted by a jury of retail theft, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Marvin Brown, Jr. was charged by criminal information filed on July 25, 2007 in 
Fourth District Court with one count of retail theft with prior convictions, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-602, and 76-6-412 respectively (R. 
01). At the preliminary hearing held on September 25, 2007, the Court found probable 
cause and the charge was bound over for trial (R. 24-22). 
On March 3, 2008 Brown made a motion for a bifurcated trial (R. 38-37). The 
defendant requested that the court bifurcate the retail theft portion of the trial from the 
prior convictions portion of the trial and prohibit any information regarding prior 
convictions from being presented to the jury based on it being unduly prejudicial and 
inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The State did 
not have a response and a notice to submit for decision was made on May 2, 2008 (R. 
57). 
On May 13, 2008, the State filed notice of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence (R. 
74-73). The State argued it was allowed to show evidence of prior convictions to prove 
Brown's intent, and also to show an absence of mistake or accident (R. 73). 
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At the pretrial conference on May 13, 2008, the trial court granted the motion to 
bifurcate and decided to address the issue of admissibility of the prior convictions under 
Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) on the morning of the first day of trial (R. 181: 3-6). 
On June 4, 2008, the jurytrial commenced (R. 78-77). Prior to seating the jury, the 
court heard arguments on the motion to enter the defendant's prior conviction under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 404(b) (R. 5-18). Defense counsel preserved the issue for appeal with 
a timely objection statmg that the prior conviction was not similar enough to prove intent 
and that a defense of mistake or accident had not been asserted by the defendant (R. 182: 
9-15, 17-18). The trial court ruled the evidence admissible with a limiting instruction to 
the jury (R. 182: 18). The limiting instruction, which was given at the time of admission 
and again prior to jury deliberations, stated: 
"You are instructed that any and all evidence relating to the defendant's prior 
commission and conviction of retail theft in 2006 is only admitted for the purpose 
of attempting to prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, preparation, common 
plan or scheme, or absence of mistake or accidents as to the present retail theft 
charge facing the defendant. Specifically evidence of the prior conviction cannot 
be considered as proof of character or a propensity to commit theft" 
(R. 182: 189). 
After two days of trial and approximately two and a half hours of deliberation, the 
jury returned a guilty verdict (R. 100-99, 110). Brown then stipulated to the prior 
convictions for purposes of the bifurcated trial and making a record of findings as to prior 
conviction (R. 99, 182: 337-339). 
On July 22, 2008, Brown was given a suspended sentence of one to five years in 
prison, ordered to spend 150 days in the Utah County Jail with credit granted for time 
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served, placed on probation for 36 months, and given a suspended fine of $5000 (R. 145-
142). 
On August 29, 2008, notice of appeal was filed with the Fourth Distiict Court (R. 
151). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Jerry McCann 
Jerry McCann is a loss prevention officer at Macey's Groceiy Store (R. 182: 131). 
On June 19, 2007 he observed Marvin Brown, Jr. looking at batteries via a security 
camera (R. 182: 132). He observed Brown select three packages of batteries and slide 
them under a box of chicken from the deli section (R. 182: 135). He then saw Brown 
walk toward the back of the store, then walk up the middle aisle and approach a 
checkstand (R. 182: 136). 
On the camera he saw Brown walk through the checkstand, point to the box of 
chicken and begin to walk out of the store (R. 182: 136). He then stopped Brown before 
the store exit and asked him if he had any Macey's merchandise he had not paid for (R. 
182: 139). Brown pulled out the batteries and told him he was looking for his father (R. 
182: 143). 
He escorted Brown to a security room to be detained. (R. 182: 143). When 
questioned as to why he took the batteries, Brown replied that he was lookmg for his 
father (R. 182: 144). When further questioned as to why he didn't leave the batteries in 
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the store and go look for his father or tell the checker about the batteries as he walked 
through, Brown said, "I don't know." (R. 182: 144). 
B. Testimony of Katie Williams 
Katie Williams was formerly a cashier at Macey's Grocery Store in Pleasant 
Grove, Utah and was working on June 19, 2007 (R. 182: 179-181). On that day. Brown 
entered her checkstand and when asked if he was ready to be rung up, he pointed to a 
receipt and continued to walk through the checkout; she assumed he had aheady paid and 
let him continue (R. 182: 182). She only saw the chicken in his hand (R. 182: 185-186). 
She also testified that he appeared to be looking around for someone (R. 182: 184-185). 
C. Testimony of Mike Doyl 
Mike Doyl is a police officer with Payson City Police Department (R. 182: 188). 
On November 16, 2006 he responded to Wal-Mart in Payson (R. 182: 190). Upon 
arriving he interviewed Brown, who had been detained by a loss prevention officer, and 
Brown told him that he had come to the store to return some items and had been given 
pink stickers for those items, however, instead of returning them he took the sticker off 
and placed it on a different item from the electronics section (R. 182: 190-191). He told 
Officer Doyl he had attempted to leave the store and was stopped by the loss prevention 
officer outside of the store (R. 182: 192). Brown pled guilty to the charge resulting from 
the incident (R. 182: 194). 
D. Testimony of Anthony Howell 
Anthony Howell is an attorney and also a shopper at the Pleasant Grove Macey's 
Grocery Store (R. 182: 224-225). He testified as to the layout of the store, the batteries 
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section particularly, and his recent purchase of a variety of different batteries from this 
section (R. 182: 225-230). He described the store's exit and also the items for sale outside 
of the store's exit (R. 182: 230-231). 
E. Testimony of Marvin Brown, Sr. 
Marvin Brown, Sr. is the defendant's father and was with the defendant in 
Macey's on June 19, 2007 (R. 182: 238-239). He and his son went to the store to 
purchase some chicken (R. 182: 239). After purchasing the chicken at the deli, he told his 
son that he had forgotten to pick up some gravy and that he would meet at the truck (R. 
182: 240). He handed Marvin, Jr. the chicken and the receipt (R. 182: 240). He found the 
gravy and purchased it at the checkout (R. 182: 241). He saw Marvin, Jr. waiting at the 
front doors and decided to sneak up on him and surprise him (R. 182: 241-242). At that 
point a man cut in between him and his son and began questioning Mamn about whether 
or not he had anything he had not paid for (R. 182: 242). After trying to approach his son 
and the store employee, he was told to move out of the way (R. 182: 242). 
F. Testimony of Marvin Brown, Jr. 
Marvin Brown, Jr. is the defendant (R. 182: 248). On June 19, 2007 he was in 
Macey's Grocery Store in Pleasant Grove (R. 182: 248). He and his father went into the 
store to purchase a chicken (R. 182: 249). After purchasing the chicken, his father told 
him he forgot something and left to go pick it up. He decided to surprise his dad by 
picking up some batteries that his dad needed for a laser light (R. 182: 249). His father 
had looked at several other stores and had been unable to find the particular batteries (R. 
182:250-251). 
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He thought he would find the batteries and meet his father at the checkout to give 
him the batteries he had found for him to purchase (R. 182: 251). After finding the 
batteries he went through the store looking for his father and thought he saw him standing 
near the exit and went to go meet him (R. 182: 252). He walked through the checkstand 
and told the cashier that his father was right there (R. 182: 252). He thought he told her 
about the batteries at that time (R. 182: 252, 260). After walking through to where he 
thought he saw his father he couldn't see his dad anymore, he then walked over to look 
out at his truck to see if his dad was there (R. 182: 252). 
After looking at his truck, he went to turn around and was approached by McCann, 
the loss prevention officer (R. 182: 252). After McCann asked him if he had anything that 
he had not paid for he pulled out the batteries from under the box of chicken (R. 182: 
252-253). Then he was asked to follow McCann upstairs (R. 182: 253). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse Marvin Brown conviction based on the trial court's 
error in admitting evidence of prior convictions under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The prior convictions did not prove intent or absence of 
mistake/accident, and their prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
BROWN'S PHIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER RULES 404(b) AND 403 OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
"It is of course fundamental in our law that a peison can be convicted only foi acts 
committed and not uecause of geneial charactei 01 piochvity to commit bad acts " State 
v Reed, 2000 UT 68, f^ 23, 8 P 3d 1025 Utah Courts have long iecogmzed the piejudicial 
effect of puor conviction evidence Salt Lake City v Struhs, 2004 UT App 489, f^ 14, 106 
P 3d 188 The Utah Supieme Court has stated, uWe do not doubt that 'evidence of pnoi 
convictions and othei bad acts has tiemendous potential to sway the findei of fact 
unfaiily" and mcieases the likelihood of comiction " State \ hloiez, 111 P 2d 452 459 
(Utah 1989), see also State v Holder, 694 P 2d 583, 584 (Utah 1984) (pei cunam) 
(Stating cc[s]uch evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used with extieme 
caution because of the prejudicial effect it may have on the findei of fact") Foi this 
reason there are "rigorous criteria" foi admitting evidence of other dimes oi wiongs 
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence United States \ Cuch, 842 F 2d 
1173, 1176 (10th Cir 1988) 
When analyzmg admissibility of bad-acts evidence, a trial court must determine 
(1) whether evidence is being offered foi a proper, non-charactei purpose, (2) whether 
such evidence is relevant, and (3) whether evidence must be excluded as more prejudicial 
than probative Utah R Evid 402, 403, 404(b), State v Rees, 2004 UT App 51, % 2, 88 
P 3d 359 (citing State v Decorso, 1999 UT 57,1f 20, 993 P 2d 837, cert denied, 528 U S 
1164, 120 SCt 1181 (2002)) 
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"Even if evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose and is relevant, 
the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence wis substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfan* prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.5" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 20, 6 P.3d 1120 (quotmg Utah R. Evid. 
403). Accordingly, even if Brown's prior conviction of retail theft had been offered for a 
proper purpose and was relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative under the third 
prong of the analysis. 
To be admissible, the prior bad act evidence "must have real probative value, not 
just possible worth/' United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660, 662 (10th Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Morales-Qinnones, 812 F.2d 604, 612 (10th Cir. 1987). Even if the prior 
conviction has real probative value, however, it is inadmissible if its prejudicial effect 
substantially outweighs such probative value. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated several factors, termed the Shickles factors, which 
should be evaluated in determining whether to exclude evidence under rule 403. These 
include: (1) the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, (2) the 
similarities between the crimes, (3) the interval of time that has elapsed between the 
crimes, (4) the need for the evidence, (5) the efficacy of alternative proof, and (6) the 
degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); see also Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at \ 
29, 993 P.2d 837, State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990). The second and sixth 
criteria are particularly applicable in this case. 
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Moreover, when certain actions of a current charge are similar to a previous 
conviction, unless those similarities are "peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct" 
and not just of the type of crime committed the similarities between the two camiot be 
found to constitute a common design or modus operandi. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6 
(Utah App. 1990). There are no real similarities between Brown's prior conviction for 
retail theft and the current charge, other than the type of crime committed. 
In the prior conviction, Brown entered the store to return two items. After 
receiving a return sticker, instead of actually returning the items, he proceeded to the 
electronics depaitment and took the return sticker from one of the items and put it on an 
item he had not purchased. He then attempted to leave the store and to give the 
impression that he had already purchased the item since it had a return sticker attached to 
it. The item remained in plain view, effectively saying to store employees that he 
purchased this item. 
In the current charge, Brown had batteries under a box of chicken when it was 
presumed he was attempting to leave the store. He had a receipt for the chicken but not 
for the batteries. The receipt would not have represented to store employees that he had 
already purchased the batteries. 
The State argued at trial that Brown attempted to use "deception" to commit retail 
theft and that this is similar enough to prove intent or absence of mistake or accident. 
However, there is no similarity between the types of "deception" used in the two cases 
that would not be common in any two cases of retail theft. 
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The lack of similarity between the prior conviction and the current charge also 
goes to its probative value under Rule 403. Without a striking similarity, at least enough 
of one to show some sort of conduct that is "peculiarly distinctive" of the defendant's 
conduct, there is little probative value. However, the likelihood of prejudicial effect is 
great. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that such evidence has '"tremendous potential 
to sway the finder of fact unfairly' and increases the likelihood of conviction." State v. 
Florez, 111 P.2d 452, 459 (Utah 1989). What minimal probative value the prior 
conviction may have, does not outweigh the prejudicial effect. In fact, the prejudicial 
effect of Brown's prior conviction substantially outweighs its slight probative value. It is 
highly likely that the finder of fact heard such evidence and concluded that he was once a 
thief and so he must also be a thief now. This amounts to unfair prejudice. 
The trial court did not carefully balance the probative value of the evidence 
against its prejudicial effect. The trial court should have concluded that the probative 
value of Brown's prior convictions was slight, while the prejudicial effect of such 
evidence was great. Because this error is such that there was a "reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the defendant in its absence," Brown requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Brown asks that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this matter to the 
trial court for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of May, 2009. 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attomey General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 12th day of March, 2009. 
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ADDENDA 
13 
Westlaw 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness 
State Court Rules 
^gJJtah Rules of Evidence (Rets & Annos) 
*iil Article IV Relevancy and Its Limits 
-+ RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CON-
FUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
except that "surprise" is not mcluded as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The change in language is not 
one of substance, since "surprise" would be withm the concept of 'unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403 See 
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more 
appropriate method of dealmg with "surprise " See also Smith v hstelle, 445 P Supp 647 (ND Tex 1977) (surprise 
use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process) See the following Utah 
cases to the same effect feny v Zions Coop Meicantile Inst, 605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979). State v Johns, 615 P 2d 
1260 (Utah 1980), Reisei v Lohneu 641 P 2d 93 (Utah 1982) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Pretrial disclosure of evidence, see Rules Ci\ Pioc Rule 26 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
Westlaw 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness 
State Court Rules 
*lsl Utah Rules of E\ idence (Rets & Annos) 
i^=3 Aiticlc IV Rele\ anc\ and Its Limits 
- • RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEP-
TIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character e\ idence generall). Evidence ot a peison s chaiacter or a trait of charactei is not admissible for the 
purpose of proMng action m conformity theiewith on a paiticular occasion except 
(a)(1) Character of accused E\ idence of a putment tiait of chaiactei ottered b> an accused 01 b) the prosecution to 
rebut the same or if evidence ot a ti ait of chaiactei of the alleged \ictim ot the crime is oftered b> the accused and 
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2) e\ idence of the same trait of chaiacter of the accused offered by the prosecution 
(a)(2) Charactei of alleged victim E\ idence of a pertinent ti ait of chaiacter of the alleged victim of the cnme of-
fered b} an accused 01 bv the prosecution to lebut the same oi e\ idence of a chaiactei trait of peacefulness of the 
alleged A ictim ofteied by the piosecution in a homicide case to iebut e\ idence that the alleged \ ictim was the fust 
aggressoi 
(a)(3) Character of witness E\ idence ot the charactei of a w ltness as provided m Rules 607, 608 and 609 
(b) Other crimes, >\ rongs, or acts. E\ idence of other dimes wrongs oi acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
tei of a person in older to show action in conformit) theiew ith It ma> howe\ er be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of moti\ e opportunity intent preparation plan knowledge identity oi absence of mistake or acci-
dent, pro\ided that upon request by the accused the prosecution in a criminal case shall pro\ide reasonable notice in 
ad\ ance of trial or during trial if the couit excuses pietnal notice on good cause shown, of the natuie of any such 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is chaiged with child molestation e\ idence of the commission of 
other acts of child molestation may be admissible to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged piovided that 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice m advance of trial, or during tnal if the court ex-
cuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial 
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule child molestation means an act committed m relation to a child under the age of 14 
which would, if committed m this state, be a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense 
(c)O) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or 
any other rule of evidence 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992, February 11, 1998, November 1, 2001, April 1, 2008 ] 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
uian mues 01 rwiaence, Kule 4U4 Page 2 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 404(a)-(b) is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the notice provisions 
already in the federal rule, add the amendments made to the federal rule effective December 1, 2000, and delete lan-
guage added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998. However, the deletion of that language is not intended to reinstate the 
holding of State v Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also 
conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible 
The 2008 amendment adds Rule 404(c). It applies in criminal cases where the accused is charged with a sexual of-
fense against a child under the age of 14 Before evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(c), the trial court should 
conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine: (1) whether the accused committed other acts, which 
if committed in this State would constitute a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense; (2) whether 
the evidence of other acts tends to prove the accused's propensity to commit the crime charged; and (3) whether un-
der Rule 403 the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, or whether 
for other reasons listed in Rule 403 the evidence should not be admitted. The court should consider the factors appli-
cable as set forth in State v Shackles, 760 P.2d 291. 295-96 (Utah 1988), which also may be applicable in determi-
nations under Rule 404(b). 
Upon the request of a party, the court may be required to provide a limiting instruction for evidence admitted under 
Rule 404(4-)) or (c). 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Ong. US Gov. Works. 
